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ABSTRACT 
Despite committed policy, regulative and professional efforts on healthcare safety, little is 
known about how such macro-interventions permeate organisations and shape culture over 
time. Informed by neo-institutional theory, we examined how inter-organisational influences 
shaped safety practices and inter-subjective meanings following efforts for coerced culture 
change. We traced macro-influences from 2000 to 2015 in infection prevention and control. 
Safety perceptions and meanings were inductively analysed from 130 in-depth qualitative 
interviews with senior and middle-level managers from 30 English hospitals. 869 institutional 
interventions were identified; 69% had a regulative component. In this context of forced 
implementation of safety practices, staff experienced inherent tensions concerning the scope 
of safety, their ability to be open, and prioritisation of external mandates over local need. 
These tensions stemmed from conflicts among three co-existing institutional logics prevalent 
in the NHS. In response to requests for change, staff flexibly drew from a repertoire of 
cognitive, material and symbolic resources within and outside their organisations. They 
crafted ‘strategies of action’, guided by a situated assessment of first-hand practice 
experiences complementing collective evaluations of interventions as ‘pragmatic’, 'sensible', 
and also 'legitimate'. Macro-institutional forces exerted influence either directly on 
individuals or indirectly by enriching the organisational cultural repertoire. 
Words: 197 
 
Keywords: Safety culture; neo-institutional theory; infection prevention and control; patient 
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What is missing from organisational safety culture research in health care? 
The importance of promoting and fostering a culture of safe practice has been 
emphasised in health policy reports (DH 2000; IOM 1999) and pertinent research literature 
(McCarthy and Blumenthal 2006; Leape and Berwick 2000; Vincent and Amalberti 2016) for 
nearly two decades. Consistently, inquiries into patient safety failings have recognised the 
need for cultural as much as structural and operational changes in systems and organisations 
(Walshe and Shortell 2004). A sociological perspective can offer insights into the wider 
social, cultural and political contextual factors beyond the narrow technical aspects of 
providing patient care (Waring et al. 2016).  
As with organisational culture (Martin 2002), ‘safety culture’ may be understood as the 
taken-for-granted beliefs presented in patterns of thought, language, and behaviour (Martin 
2002).  Specifically, safety culture has been conceptualised as “the corporate atmosphere or 
culture in which safety is understood to be, and is accepted as, the number one priority” 
(Cullen 1990: 300). Using this definition, taken-for-granted beliefs and values that are shared 
among organisational members guide actions by defining appropriate behaviour for various 
situations (Fiol 1991; Schein 1988). Organisations promote a culture of safety by consistently 
prioritising safe working practices and behaviours (Reason 1997). Multiple interacting 
factors, including psychological, structural, and professional, contribute to the development 
of a safety culture (Flin 2007; Smits et al. 2009). 
While failings in healthcare safety are increasingly recognised as a social problem 
(Dixon-Woods 2010), and many government-led policy and regulative initiatives have been 
implemented to promote a culture of safety in healthcare organisations worldwide, extant 
research has yet to fully exploit three major opportunities. First, while contexts of study are, 
as one would expect primarily organisations, sub-organisational units, or teams (Sexton et al. 
2006; Singer et al. 2003; Sorra and Nieva 2004), important wider ‘macro’ regulative, 
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professional and policy influences on safety culture are often not accounted for (Charles et al. 
2011). This is in spite of repeated calls for attention to the influence of wider societal 
considerations by researchers in the broader field of healthcare safety (e.g. Braithwaite et al 
2015; Herepath and Kitchener 2016). Second, though some emergent work does consider 
multi-layered and inter-level approaches (i.e. Reiman et al. 2010; Szymczak 2016) most still 
report single level analyses (Waring 2005). Third, there remains an over-reliance on 
pragmatic, cross-sectional surveys, and few in-depth, longitudinal studies (Singer et al. 2003; 
Halligan and Zecevic 2011). A sociological approach which in addition to technical 
considerations also considers cultural, and wider political and institutional forces can help 
address some of the above limitations. Furthermore, an in-depth, interpretivist study can 
elaborate beyond the often inferred empirical experiences reported in the predominantly  
positivist approaches prevalent in this field.   
 
Theoretical Background: An Institutional Theory Lens on Safety Culture 
The institutionalist approach in organisational analysis conceptualises organisations as 
embedded in a system of broader social structures, the institutions (Meyer and Rowan 1977). 
Institutions are important in that they offer a high degree of resilience, providing stability and 
a sense of purpose to social life. This early institutional literature has been critiqued for 
portraying institutions as overly stabilising and persistent and for paying inadequate attention 
to change and disregarding  the agentic actions of individuals (Aten et al. 2012). In response, 
the emergence of neo-institutionalism (Powell and DiMaggio 1991) enriched earlier 
institutionalist conceptualisations by emphasising meaning, interpretation, and culture. In this 
approach, organisations comprise social systems influenced by wider cultural-cognitive 
elements, norms, and legal frameworks to which they must conform to be perceived as 
legitimate entities and receive social support (Scott et al. 2000). The institutions comprise 
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three main “pillars” of legally sanctioned regulative structures (e.g. laws, policies, contracts), 
morally governed normative elements (e.g. professional norms, values, customs, 
expectations) and cultural-cognitive frameworks (such as widely shared beliefs and 
assumptions in the form of institutional logics) that create a common frame of meaning or 
definition of a situation.  
Neo-institutional theory complements preceding conceptualisations by bringing the 
third “pillar” of cognition and culture to the forefront of institutional analysis. According to 
this perspective, individuals often act in certain ways not because they must conform to 
enforced rules to avoid punishment (regulative influence), or due to feelings of social 
obligation (normative influence), but rather because they can conceive of no alternative; their 
mental maps direct their cognition towards a particular way of thinking (cognitive influence). 
Whereas traditional institutional theory depicts organisations as passive receptors of extra-
organisational rules and norms that influence the creation and maintenance of organisational 
culture, more recently, researchers have begun to present institutional environments beset 
with dormant ambiguities that social actors can leverage and reinterpret (Phillips et al. 2004).  
In this stream of work much of the institutional logics research to date has focused on 
the macro level of analysis (Thornton et al. 2012), with few empirical studies exploring the 
microdynamics of logics within organisational life, being short of explaining how logics are 
negotiated by actors on the ground. The logics perspective offers a way to analyse 
“historically situated pluralities” that shape cultural repertoires and offer organisational 
participants prescriptions for behaviour (Weber et al. 2003: pp 352). Organisational fields are 
characterised by institutional complexity due to a plurality of available logics, which are 
linked to more than one paradigm (Greenwood et al. 2011). For example, in health systems 
such as the NHS the professional logic of medical care coexists and often conflicts with a 
market and corporate logic of business-like healthcare (e.g. Scott, et al 2000; Reay and 
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Hinings 2009). In addition, the NHS being funded and run by the state is subject to strong 
government influences in the form of policy and legislative mandates, thus a third type of 
influence in the form of a state logic is also evident (Reay et al 2017). There is growing 
recognition that pressures stemming from multiple institutional logics create interpretive and 
strategic ambiguity for organisational participants (Greenwood et al. 2011). When socially 
embedded actors continually and collectively experience tensions in their immediate social 
context arising from institutional contradictions within and across social systems they can 
become conscious and reflective (Seo and Creed 2002). Under such conditions of 
contradiction and tension they can be transformed from passive participants reproducing 
existing social patterns into active agents undertaking collective action for change. This 
analytical institutionalist approach closely resembles attempts to reflect on pluralities in other 
sociologically informed research streams, such as culture studies and the work on repertoires 
(Swidler 1986), vocabularies in sensemaking (Weick, 1995), or normativity and orders of 
justification (Boltanski and Thevenot, 2006). 
Along a similar line, recent efforts in the organisational culture literature emphasise 
cultural dynamism and change (Hatch 2010), also evident in select safety culture literature. 
For instance, based on the model of Berger and Luckmann (1966) taking a constructivist 
perspective, Antonsen (2009) describes the process of culture creation in three stages of 
externalisation, institutionalisation/objectification and internalisation. The dialectic 
relationship between the three processes allow in each cycle for active interpretation and 
changes in expectations or the ‘rules of the game’ for future interaction. A stream of work in 
sociology which focuses on cultural actions and processes as opposed to norms (Swidler 
1986) explains cultural change by considering the malleability of symbolic resources. This 
literature portrays culture not simply as a constraint on action but as a “repertoire of actions” 
(Kaufman 2004), a resource that can be deployed by actors to design action within 
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organisations (Howard-Grenville et al. 2011).  Symbols are viewed rich and multivocal, 
which can have more than one meaning for organisational participants; thus, they have the 
potential to create tensions. In this view, variation in culture arises from different ways of 
mobilising culture to link it with action (Swidler 2001). This approach opens up the 
possibility for potentially anyone within an organisation, to change culture. “Social actors 
draw from the repertoire to enact culturally learned skills and habits. When these skills and 
habits are part of a larger pattern, typically in response to certain kinds of problems or 
circumstances, the pattern becomes one of an individual's ‘strategies of action’.”(Howard-
Grenville et al. 2011: p.524).  
To sum up, these recent efforts in neo-institutional analysis and the plurality of logics 
which offer points for conversation with research on organisational culture inform our study. 
Both focus the analytic attention to individuals and their activities and interactions, in which 
the ongoing work of interpretation, meaning, and sensemaking are central (Zilber 2007). 
Inspired by the theoretical debate outlined above, we focused our efforts on exploring aspects 
of safety culture in the realm of infection prevention and control (IPC), which is a constituent 
element of delivering safe care. Our selection of IPC in England as the setting for an 
empirical study offered us a unique opportunity to study the dynamics of system-level 
intentional culture change to promote safety, with sustained pressure exerted over a 15-year 
period. How was the prolonged extra-organisational pressure to change organisational culture 
and promote safety, interpreted and enacted ‘on the ground’ by organisational members?  
In this article we adopted a multi-level approach informed by theoretical arguments in 
neo-institutional and organisational culture literatures to empirically investigate the 
experiences and interpretations of hospital professionals concerning patient safety within the 
setting of IPC in England. Infection control has been high on the political agenda and on the 
agenda of the NHS in England for the last 15 years. A 2000 National Audit Office (NAO) 
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report was highly critical of the strategic management of HCAIs in England , especially the 
lack of information about infections and the limited resources allocated to infection control 
teams. A key problem was that the size and scope of HCAIs was simply unknown. A 
voluntary scheme for reporting Blood Stream Infections (BSIs) had existed during the 1990s, 
but suffered from problems of completeness and comparability. More broadly, the report 
suggested that HCAIs had come to be seen as an intractable problem, regarded by those 
working in hospitals (clinicians and managers) as an inevitable consequence of providing 
health care. Such infections were ‘regrettable, but were to a large extent tolerated’ (Health 
Foundation, 2015). In 2001, mandatory reporting of MRSA BSI cases in hospitals was 
introduced, with a few other selected infections included in the surveillance programme in 
subsequent years (further details of the strategic policy context are provided in the results 
section). 
 
Given the analytic preference for the role of cognition and culture on behaviour and an 
emphasis on broader social forces beyond the level of the organisation, neo-institutional 
theory has the potential to provide needed insights. We aimed to extend understanding of 
safety culture in NHS hospitals by offering a much-needed nuanced understanding of how 
organisational culture and neo-institutional theory can synergistically inform collective 
meaning creation following efforts for intentional cultural change (Hatch and Zilber 2012). 
 
Methods 
We employed an inductive qualitative case study design (Creswell 1998; Yin 2003) - an 
appropriate approach when little is known about a phenomenon. Our empirical case 
comprises IPC in the English NHS in 2000-2015, which can be considered an exemplar case 
(Yin 2003) because health policy changes aimed at improving patient safety in this clinical 
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area over this period were: a) innovative, b) entailed high-magnitude change, and c) unfolded 
in a relatively short period of time.  
To meet the research aims, we first tracked changes in IPC policy and service delivery 
in acute care at the institutional (NHS), and organisational (NHS hospitals) levels. We then 
explored how systemic interventions aimed at reducing healthcare-associated infections 
(HCAIs) and to promote a ‘safety culture’ in hospitals were perceived and experienced by 
individuals (staff with managerial responsibilities). Interventions are here defined as 
initiatives, actions or processes, created, documented and circulated in the public domain by a 
collective entity.  
To capture multi-level influences two main data sources were used; textual sources and 
qualitative interviews. We purposefully sampled diverse hospitals in terms of size, 
geography, and university affiliation. Nine NHS Trusts across England comprising 30 
different hospitals were included. The interview sample consisted of 130 senior and middle-
level managers purposively selected for their organisational role and close involvement in 
IPC clinical management, quality improvement and patient safety (Table 1). Senior 
respondents (23% of the sample) included director level and above (Medical Directors, 
Directors of Nursing, Directors of IPC and senior estates/operational managers).  
Participants were first approached via email, with a participant information sheet, and 
consent form. Our topic guide included questions about professional role, and perceptions 
and experiences regarding safety issues in IPC and the NHS. We also explored the motivation 
of staff to engage in safe practices and the perceived sources of pressure to improve IPC 
hospital performance. The questions asked for reflection on current practices as well as 
retrospective recounting of the studied period. Interviews were conducted face-to-face, at the 
respondents’ place of work, lasted 60-90 minutes, were digitally recorded and transcribed 
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verbatim, and conducted between April 2011 and July 2012 with follow up interviews with 
four of the participants in 2014. NHS research ethics approval was gained.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 Here 
--------------------------------- 
We used an inductive approach to analyse these interviews (cf., Gioia et al. 2012). 
Three of the authors (YK, RA, MI) independently read and reread the transcripts and coded 
the data with the help of the NVivo 11 software (QSR International, Cambridge, MA). We 
began our analysis using open coding to identify first order or empirical themes (Strauss and 
Corbin 1990), typically describing issues raised by our participants. This first stage coding 
was followed by axial coding into more abstract cluster themes, assisted by reading relevant 
literature on institutional logics and organisational culture (ibid). The emerging coding 
structure was discussed amongst our team of co-authors in two workshop formats and 
refined. Finally, we aggregated these second order conceptual themes into the aggregate 
themes that help explain how hospital staff made sense of forceful changes on safety 
collectively. The multidisciplinary and multi-professional authorship helped with 
considerations of personal and epistemological reflexivity (Cunliffe 2003). Figure 1 outlines 
the full code structure. The large number of interviews, the engagement of multiple 
investigators in data coding and interpretation, as well as the consistency of emergent themes, 
gave us confidence in the relevance and validity of our findings.   
Textual data was used to identify all interventions implemented in the studied period 
and to reveal institutional dynamics. The search was informed by expertise within the team 
(Health Foundation, 2015), senior clinicians and policy makers, interview participants . Text 
generated by a collective entity such as a regulatory agency or professional association 
reflects the entity’s perspective in specific moments in time. Documentary materials are 
routinely used in healthcare research to delineate institutional influences (e.g. Reay and 
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Hinings 2005). A total of 1045 textual sources were analysed from four main categories: (1) 
policy documents, guidelines, and legislation produced by central NHS bodies; (2) hospital 
human resource documents, board minutes, reports and strategies on IPC; (3) documentary 
evidence from professional associations; (4) documentary material from outside healthcare, 
such as newspaper articles concerning HCAIs and antimicrobial resistance. The latter focused 
on the ‘popular’ (The Sun and The Daily Mail) and ‘quality’ (The Daily Telegraph and The 
Times) press, selecting the two highest circulations in each.  
Using an iterative process and key word searches the interventions inventory was 
compiled and then each intervention systematically categorised to the three institutional 
pillars outlined in our theoretical framework. Categorisation was not mutually exclusive.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 Here  
--------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
Findings  
Institutional dynamics 
A total of 869 interventions related to IPC, patient safety and antimicrobial 
stewardship were identified in the period 2000-15 (full list of interventions available upon 
request). Most interventions (69%) had a regulative component (602), with fewer (40%) 
entailing normative (349), and 37% cultural-cognitive (324) institutional influences (Figure 
2). The most intense activity was seen in two periods, 2006-08 and 2013-14, coinciding with 
spurs of government-driven regulatory action in this area (e.g. the radical NHS reforms 
introduced in the Health and Social Care Act 2012 led to a peak of IPC interventions in 2013-
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14). A shift towards a higher proportion of normative interventions was observed post 2012. 
Examples of key interventions are discussed in findings below.  
---------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 Here 
------------------------------ 
Institutional influences by governing and funding bodies 
The institutional influences on safety culture in NHS hospitals reflected upon by the 
respondents included regulatory and policy interventions from the Department of Health 
(DH), arm's-length NHS governing bodies, such as the Care Quality Commission (CQC) 
regulator, NHS Improvement, Public Health England and the National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence (NICE), and government agencies such as the National Audit Office 
(NAO). Our documentary analysis showed an escalation of such influences, which had 
stemmed from cumulative pressure for action from politicians, the public, and the media in 
response to significantly increasing rates of MRSA and C. difficile infections in English 
hospitals in the early 2000s (e.g. MailOnline 2005; Templeton and Leonard 2005). Two NAO 
reports in 2000 (NAO 2000) and 2004 (NAO 2004) triggered change in the public discourse. 
They demonstrated that HCAIs, which had received little public attention before this, were 
the cause of unacceptably high patient disability and mortality and were also a huge cost to 
the NHS. As infection rates rose, increasingly prescriptive policy directives were produced by 
the DH (e.g. DH 2004), and this regulatory activity culminated with the introduction of the 
Hygiene Code in 2006, a pioneering legislative act in Europe (DH 2006). Mandatory 
surveillance for MRSA was introduced in 2001 and targets to reduce MRSA bloodstream 
infections in trusts were initially introduced in 2004. Mandatory surveillance of C. difficile 
was introduced in 2004, and targets to reduce the number of cases of C. difficile were firstly 
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introduced in 2007. Over the years, DH continued to raise its expectations and current NHS 
policy sets stretch targets for each trust, including zero MRSA bloodstream infections.  
 
Professional institutional influences 
A subtler external influence on hospital staff stemmed from peer influence via 
professional networks. Organisational members became increasingly aware of what other 
trusts were doing and how they were performing. In particular, respondents perceived 
hospitals or clinicians with reputation or ‘kudos’ in effectively tackling HCAIs as role models 
for positive change:  
I think probably the biggest enabling factor [for prioritising safety] was senior 
clinicians, both nursing and doctors, saying: “We’ve got a problem. They are doing 
it differently elsewhere they are doing better than us. We need to do it differently”. 
[T9M8 – Senior Medical Manager] 
 
Professional associations were another institutional influence which shaped norms 
and role expectations in IPC. Dedicated professional training, research and practitioner 
journals, annual conferences in IPC were established. Professional associations expanded 
their scope and membership, reinforcing the shared narrative ‘IPC being everybody’s 
business’. As an example, the Hospital Infection Society, initiated in the 1980s by Medical 
Microbiologists to “foster the scientific interests of those hospital doctors who were 
interested in nosocomial or hospital acquired infections” (HIS 2011) widened its 
membership, and in 2011 was renamed the Healthcare Infection Society. A similar trajectory 
towards multi-professional membership was noted in nursing professional associations (IPS 
2011) and participants stressed the importance of such institutional changes  in shaping 
expectations for the involvement of diverse healthcare professionals in IPC. Most 
respondents however reported that nurses’ roles remained central to IPC improvement and 
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attributed this to ‘historical ownership of IPC by nurses’, pre-dating the intense policy focus 
seen in the last decade:  
The infection control agenda was almost entirely run through the nursing staff. So, it 
was the nursing staff who knew that if an infection occurred on their ward they were 
going to be held up in front of the senior nurse and have to account why it might have 
happened. [T5M5 – Medical Manager] 
 
The novel role of ‘Antibiotic Pharmacists’ to support prudent hospital antibiotic prescribing 
also emerged more as a ground up initiative, through on-the-job training in the 1990s, and 
was later endorsed in key policy documents (i.e. DH 2003) supported with government 
funding for creating hospital posts. 
 
Intra-organisational dynamics on safety culture 
Organisational structures, roles and accountability mechanisms 
Institutional influences resulted in organisational-level changes, such as the creation 
of new organisational roles, and accountability systems in IPC including transfer of 
accountability for meeting the mandatorily reported MRSA and C. difficile targets to trust 
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). New activity patterns and practices were enacted including 
routine hospital leadership ‘Walk-Rounds’, regular reports to the hospital Board with 
infection control becoming a permanent Board agenda item, infection control targets built 
into hospital performance management systems, improvement programmes on cleanliness, 
hand hygiene, antibiotic prescribing. These organisational changes were interpreted by our 
participants, as further symbolic and material support for the patient safety agenda, and were 
cited as gradually shaping a culture of safety:   
the way we work in infection prevention has actually influenced and provided 
innovation to improve patient safety and quality, particularly in regards to 
monitoring and surveillance and feedback, that is a really powerful tool...it’s shaped 
a huge amount, but very softly-softly, it has really I think shaped culture and it is 
really amazing…I have to sit at every trust board and give a report. Which is good, 
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it’s the recognition that even the act of doing that data is good, it reinforces 
processes that you want to happen. [T1M10– Senior Medical Manager] 
 
Another key organisational change stemming from regulatory action was the 
introduction of a new senior organisational role, the Director of Infection Prevention and 
Control (DIPC), reporting directly to the CEO and the Board; in most hospitals also taking 
Board membership. The role incumbent (doctor or nurse) gained executive power, and status, 
with the ability to influence hospital strategic decisions. Prior to government intervention, 
infection control was seen as low profile, often referred to as the NHS ‘Cinderella service’. 
Hospital IPC teams were small, including almost exclusively nurses, with limited 
organisational influence and no formal representation at senior management. The above 
organisational changes combined, demonstrate an additional indirect path of influence on 
hospital staff on safety from the institutional environment via altering the organisational 
context.  
 
Tensions experienced by staff stemming from conflict of institutional logics 
Staff experienced inherent tensions with widely held beliefs about what was expected 
from them in controlling infections, about what comprises safe patient care, or what 
constituted acceptable levels of risk in tackling HCAIs. The tensions stemmed from 
conflicting demands of co-existing institutional logics shaping healthcare. A market/corporate 
logic promoted a business-like rationale guiding organisational decisions and the overall 
running of hospitals; a state logic prioritised political factors in providing services to satisfy 
the needs and rights of ‘citizens’ while safeguarding the NHS as a public good. Such 
rationalisations where not always aligned with the traditional professional medical-clinical 
logic.  
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Tension on the scope of safety: universal vs restricted 
Despite resulting in undoubtedly substantial organisational-level change, the sustained 
15-year effort by institutional-level governing and funding agencies was variably interpreted 
for its effects on IPC safety; along a continuum of helpful to inauspicious. Participants often 
reported that their views had changed over time and fluctuated in both directions along this 
continuum:   
For me the infection targets have been the best thing that’s ever happened to 
infection control, and I used to hate targets, but I don’t, I think without those 
there wouldn’t have been that driver nationally, so I think they were great.  
We’re getting into the position where we’ve made such achievements that 
targets are becoming slightly unrealistic now because they’re placing all 
these targets on you, but actually can you go any better? Particularly in an 
acute teaching hospital that’s so specialised, you will get patients with 
infections, it’s inevitable…huge amounts of pressure. [T9M1 – Nurse 
Manager] 
 
[Targets] can be motivating for some and demotivating for others. 
Personally, I’m naturally competitive therefore if you say ‘you’re 5th from the 
bottom’ that motivates me to try and be better. I cope with the pressure. 
[T9M8 – Senior Medical Manager] 
 
On the one hand, through external and coerced efforts to change practices in IPC via 
laws, regulations, guidelines and standard operating procedures, participants felt that safety 
was increasingly viewed as a strategic priority objective across the NHS. This was in contrast 
to patchy efforts that had failed in the past. The trusts’ performance in reducing HCAIs was 
regularly monitored and managed and was set as a prerequisite for acquiring Foundation 
Trust status. The Health Act in 2006, made it a legal requirement for CEOs to put systems in 
place to minimise the risk of HCAIs. In an increasingly austere NHS context the imposition 
by NHS regulators of contractual clauses linked to infection control performance and 
financial penalties when infection targets were not met, helped further rationalise safety as a 
top organisational objective. This sentiment was reinforced by substantial investment in 
material resources in this area over the years by the NHS. 
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If I’m absolutely honest, it’s from an external pressure now [the motivation to 
change]. I would like to think most of it came from the fact that we want to do the 
right things for our patients, and we want to maintain patient safety. But infection 
prevention is very high on the agenda at the moment. And certainly we [as a trust] 
are very target driven. In some ways to the detriment of other infection prevention 
issues…it’s been made very clear, in no uncertain terms, that actually if we don’t 
come in under target, or objective whatever you want to call it now, we will be 
severely penalised. [T2M4 – Nurse Manager] 
 
Participants noted that IPC was increasingly pervasive in both the public and 
organisational discourse, in their daily communications and interactions with colleagues, an 
experience denoted in the empirical theme ‘IPC widely talked about’. Macro-influences such 
as media accounts, legislation, policy reports provided organisational members with a 
continuous supply of discursive resources and rationales for action that were available to staff 
to draw upon. IPC was widely seen as an organisational priority, commonly phrased as 
“Being everybody’s business”.  
I think IPC is a top priority; we report our performance on a monthly basis up to 
board level. So, there is board level commitment in terms of reducing health care 
associated infection…It’s something that is talked about. I think we all feel 
devastated if we have a bacteraemia of any sort within the trust. […], we’ve now 
managed to get it within the culture and we’re beginning to change the culture of the 
organisation in terms of patient safety. [T2M13 – Senior Nurse Manager] 
 
 
The quote above by the nurse manager shows a more nuanced understanding of how 
safety principles were translated into performance management mechanisms (e.g. monthly 
IPC performance reporting), thus further projecting a “shared commitment”. Also, of note is 
the informant’s description of a strong collective emotional response in the case of IPC safety 
breaches (“we feel devastated”), indicating that safety had become not simply a priority but 
part of the shared value system, arguably suggesting the creation of a culture of safety. 
Overall, there was agreement that the prolonged institutional pressures and the coerced 
implementation of new practices using sanctions and incentives facilitated a re-thinking of 
organisational priorities, with more emphasis on IPC and patient safety. They also offered 
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cognitive, symbolic and material resources which hospital staff flexibly drew upon to 
interpret, legitimise, and action safety tasks in IPC.  
On the other hand, there was also recognition by our participants that safety 
prioritisation may only last for as long as external pressures persist. Maintaining 
improvements in IPC requires a great deal of management attention on processes and 
administration, at a time when other challenges may also draw attention. Participants also 
cautioned against an often narrow conceptualisation of safety as exemplified by the focus on 
a limited number of IPC indicators as performance objectives, which only reflect a narrow 
range of infections. There were no meaningful or robust comparable data routinely collected 
on other healthcare associated infections, which according to available data, continued to 
increase (NAO 2009). Particularly from a professional/clinical logic this restricted scope of 
capturing safety did not sit well with internalised beliefs and values that support delivering 
safe practice at a universal level – for all infections, across healthcare settings and balancing 
individual patient needs without compromising public health outcomes. A restricted safety 
scope aligned well with performance management from a market/corporate logic perspective. 
Concerted organisational effort on selected centrally managed targets, through close 
performance monitoring, incentives and financial penalties were perceived realistic and 
appropriate. A state logic guided by principles of accountability and transparency would also 
promote a visible response on a selected number of hospital infections. By disseminating key 
indicators of HCAIs by hospital, this provided a comparable quality mark across the board.  
 
Some informants illustrated examples of what they termed “passive resistance” when 
people’s assumptions about the appropriate way of accomplishing safety in specific 
situational contexts differed.  
I think the biggest obstacle is just the mindset of not wanting to do it really, and 
people will present that in all sorts of positive ways but the bottom line is, and it’s 
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what I call passive resistance, every help they could possibly afford you short of any 
actual real system, and that’s hard to spot sometimes because everybody’s agreeing 
and everybody wants to do it and everybody’s up for it and nothing happens and 
you think, how’s that then…it’s just experience that teaches you that. [T5M8 – 
Senior Nurse Manager] 
 
In such cases there was “Shared commitment” on achieving safety in IPC, though staff might 
have disagreed on the method, or the most appropriate course of action to accomplish it.  This 
observation indicated that talking about safety was an important step which signified change, 
but at the same time was interpreted by some respondents that it had been used to “mask lack 
of action”, or suggest a false assumption that action was in line with the talking. The evident 
lack of action in some realms (e.g. improving data collection on hospital prescribing and 
compliance, tackling the issue in other parts of the health system such as PHC, community, 
care homes) further reinforced such scepticism. 
  
Tensions about ability to be open: encouraged vs feared 
The notion of tackling safety as an issue in IPC was widely accepted and expected in 
organisational discourse, which empowered individuals to feel confident to challenge 
behaviours even across hierarchies. Staff felt encouraged to be open to disclose malpractice, 
air concerns, and point out ‘what was not being done’ in addition to ‘what should be done’. 
They were encouraged to ‘Challenge the norms’ of what is acceptable and what is not. 
Nurses reported feeling more comfortable in challenging powerful medical staff. In addition 
to feeling empowered, or encouraged, staff also felt that it was ‘right’ and ‘appropriate’ to 
challenge established expectations, and behaviours where they felt safety had or may have 
been compromised. Accounts, which openly challenged the observed reality of nurses 
dominating IPC safety efforts, emerged among senior medical staff:  
The infection control agenda was almost entirely run through the nursing staff. So, 
it was the nursing staff who knew that if an infection occurred on their ward they 
were going to be hold up in front of the senior nurse and had to explain why it 
might have happened. The medical staff we are not subject to that sort of view at all 
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and so one of the first questions I would ask is ‘well why not?’ Why are the medical 
staff not part of the analysis of why these things happen?...And I think even the senior 
nurses in the trust felt it would be counterproductive dragging consultants into these 
meetings. And the result of that was that the infection control agenda became 
perceived as a nursing agenda. And the consultants were able to stand back from it 
even more and say it’s nothing to do with us, it’s all to do with the nurses…you 
could see the implementation of a lot of infection control stuff faltering on that 
basis. [T5M5 – Medical Manager] 
 
Such change in attitudes could be viewed as conducive to a safety culture requiring an 
active role by everyone. Further, while the infection performance targets were welcomed by 
many there were just as many who questioned the scientific or other evidence. Also, time 
pressures when adopting interventions often meant that the formal sifting of evidence through 
the established hierarchy of evidence did not occur. Repeatedly organisational time and effort 
were spent on what many believed as unnecessary debates, or requests for supporting 
evidence were often used to block ‘common sense actions’ (such as rolling up sleeves). 
In contrast to the accounts above participants also reported a felt fear of being open. 
This was due to organisational pressures, such as criticism by peers or even organisational 
punishment for deviating from established norms. In line with a market/corporate logic 
speaking up and whistleblowing may be beneficial for the long-term performance and 
viability of the organisation, but in the short term might also be disruptive and undermine the 
organisation’s external image and reputation. Fear of litigation might also undermine efforts 
to be open. From a clinical/professional logic ‘being open’ would be seen as the only and 
right thing to do to ensure patient wellbeing. On the other hand, to ensure professional 
autonomy and protect self-regulation, the medical profession in particular has had major 
failings in disclosing safety breaches and near misses.   
In other words, participants felt both constrained, and confident in “Challenging” 
behaviour, the evidence base, and the norm. Informants reported that the balance depended 
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significantly on the committed action of senior managers. Extreme examples from the 
interviews reported signs which may be counter to a culture of safety.  
There was a culture of not daring to put bad data because you would be castrated, 
so there are some real new answers in there about how you manage data capture 
and feedback in such a way that it has a positive impact not a negative impact.…you 
can see quite clearly it has had a much more positive impact, some of those factors 
have been addressed [by the Trust executive team]. [T1M11 – Nurse Manager] 
 
Prioritising external mandates vs local relevance 
Highly prevelant in respondent accounts was a tension between external mandates for 
organisational productivity and performance, seated within the market/corporate and state 
logics, versus ‘safety being non-negotiable’ emanating from traditional professional norms 
and clinical standards of practice (characteristic of a professional/clinical logic). Policies, 
especially on achieving infection and other targets, which many clinicians interpreted as 
“misguided”, were deemed to generate unrealistic expectations among the public and seen as 
an unwarranted intrusion into clinicians’ professional judgement. This area of tension, 
“balancing productivity with safety”, permeated routine organisational activities:  
Where it becomes an issue is where the pressure to achieve the standard or target 
goes against what is in the best interest of the patients. Mid-Staffordshire is the 
extreme of that. [T7M1 – Nurse Manager] 
 
Vying for organisational resources, time and attention among different agendas 
demonstrated in practice ‘what was given priority’, ‘what was seen as important’. This 
ongoing contestation revealed a highly internal political process, with priorities fluctuating 
between locally relevant initiatives and external mandates. The latter were often seen as being 
less pertinent to the local needs.    
I think [IPC being priority] is demonstrated in things, like finances, staffing, in 
terms of cutbacks, time on things like board committees, and simply how much the 
trust actually pushes that particular agenda. And what certainly happens here is we 
only seem to be capable about pushing one agenda at a time, so if it’s not yours you 
tend to drop back, and if it is yours you do very well because you put a lot of effort 
into it. [T4M7 – Nurse Manager] 
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Respondents cited an incompatibility of the rhetoric and expectation of ‘patient safety 
being the top priority’ with the reality in practice where operational targets got in the way: 
Maybe there are 4 hour waiting times in A&E because people are waiting for side 
rooms. Maybe they are affecting elective admissions because people are being 
isolated every time they have a bit of diarrhoea and probably there are other reasons 
for their diarrhoea. So, the focus that everybody has C. diff. until proven otherwise 
means a lot of people get side-rooms maybe blocking up areas, blocking up beds. 
[T1M17 – Medical Manager] 
 
This tension of what was seen as a political or corporate versus a professional priority for 
action reflected different worldviews on what safety entails and how to respond to infection 
risk. That culminated into a battle of perceived credibility and relevance between what is 
externally valued by political pressures and business priorities and what the professionals felt 
was relevant, valued and credible in the local context, enabling or hindering them ‘to do their 
job’:  
It’s really important for one’s own credibility that you sometimes separate yourself 
from what’s valued externally. It’s not all about MRSA all the time but unfortunately 
that is the target that’s what we have to talk about all the time. But that is such a tiny 
part of everything that is going on, such a tiny part. And can we deal with all the 
external stuff that’s lost its credibility. How do we balance the external, like 
commissioning, … this is top down. So, you have to make sure you deal with some 
local, never lose sight that you need to do things that are locally credible and 
relevant to your patient population. Because if you just do the things that the 
government mandates, you are just not doing your job.  But you have to talk about 
this stuff that is external all the time. [T1M10 – Senior Medical Manager] 
 
Macro-level interventions were problematic due to lack of flexibility and adaptability to the 
evolving situation on the ground. The early motivation that “Targets were perceived as 
realistic” because they had been seen to be achieved by other trusts, then became less 
credible and unachievable for the higher performing hospitals:  
It’s somewhat irritating really, we have a million patients come to us a year because 
our MRSA absolute number was about six. They said we need to half that. You say 
hang on a minute there you have given an organisation somewhere else the same size 
as us a target of 106, how does that stack up? They said it’s about improving on your 
own performance. That’s right but there is a point when you say actually if we hit 
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three in total how are we gonna get to one out of a million patient contacts per 
year? [T5M15 – Senior Medical Manager] 
 
How did organisational members make sense of forceful changes collectively? 
 
Our respondents individually and collectively reconciled daily ground-up and top-
down pressures for change. They reflected on an evolving environment of coerced change in 
IPC stemming from institutional influences which demanded engagement with practices 
promoting safety. Examples of such routine practices included prescriptive audit programmes 
to monitor compliance to policy standards on hand hygiene; enacting cleaning schedules and 
monitoring cleaning standards in environmental hygiene; performing infection Root Cause 
Analyses; consistently applying patient health questionnaires and pre-assessment screening to 
detect infection risks and patient decolonisation prior to admission (Clostridium difficile, 
MRSA). Staff also reflected on the practical implications of coerced changes in decreasing 
rates of HCAIs in NHS hospitals during the studied period, which we also verified via 
analysing reported clinical data for the hospitals in our sample. Many staff that reflected on 
such improvements reported a nuanced understanding of key principles that underpin a 
culture of safety:   
I think that the pressure comes from any patient that contracts a health care 
associated infection. We are harming patients and it’s a patient safety issue. And at 
board level this is how we view it. Our level of health care associated infection 
should be zero within the organisation. We have demonstrated since 2007 a year on 
year improvement but we have not quite got to zero as yet.  We’re on that journey but 
we’ve not quite got there. So, I think patient safety is paramount and that’s a 
paramount driver for the trust.  [T2M13 – Senior Nurse Manager] 
 
The forced implementation of new safety practices (e.g. hospital targets to reduce 
MRSA and C. difficile infections) required staff to engage in new patterns of behaviour (e.g. 
mandatory regular monitoring and reporting of MRSA and C. difficile infections) that 
sensitised organisational members to new values (e.g. having MRSA or C. difficile infections 
is not right, ‘we are harming patients’) and new ways of thinking (e.g. “safety is top priority” 
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“our level of health care associated infection should be zero”, “IPC is patient safety”, “low 
infections is productivity gain”). The repeated engagement in new patterns of behaviour 
resulted in new accepted forms of interaction and an associated new cultural mindset about 
risk and safety, as staff progressively changed the way they did things not because “they had 
to”, but because “it was sensible”, “it was appropriate”, or “it worked” and they reviewed 
their basic beliefs accordingly. These experiences structured future behaviours and 
interactions with others.   
Collective sensemaking involved interpretive assessments of ‘safety sensibility’, 
‘safety legitimacy’ and ‘safety pragmatism’ in response to requests for change such as “this is 
what you have to do”, “this is how we do things from now on”. As organisational members 
were progressively experiencing the consequences of engaging with new organisational 
structures and practices in their work environment they were assessing whether the outcome 
was positive or negative on safety performance. They were also assessing the relevance of 
public discourse on safety and whether this fitted with prior and individualised 
understandings of what safe practice constituted as they experienced it daily at work in their 
localities. The resultant experienced tensions and collective sensemaking on safety issues 
reflected whether staff would successfully craft new strategies of action, thus changing their 
skills, habits, and beliefs or whether they would stick to pre-existing shared assumptions and 
patterns of behaviour. 
When such strategies of action were successful we observed two ways in which 
organisational members gradually changed their cultural beliefs as they realised the actual 
impact of change in their local and immediate surroundings. In some instances, they accepted 
the value and appropriateness of new policies and practices which they linked to positive 
outcomes (e.g. hand washing linked to improved hygiene and lower rates of infections). This 
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positive assessment was reinforced when staff could convincingly find cognitive resources 
and language in the environment to justify a positive effect:    
I think, we recognise that minimising hospital acquired infections and having low 
rates of infection is a very positive productivity gain. So, if you haven’t got patients 
with pressure sores, if you haven’t got patients who are falling and hurting 
themselves, if you haven’t got patients who are acquiring hospital-based infections, 
then the length of stay in hospital will be reduced or not prolonged, and you can use 
the capacity and resources you have more effectively. So, there’s a really positive 
thing around that. [T9M5 – Senior Nurse Manager] 
 
Staff experiencing a positive situated assessment were able to instil new meaning into old 
cultural forms and practices. For example, safety was increasingly linked to not only the 
provision of optimal care (i.e. improved patient outcomes, increased user satisfaction) but 
also to sound organisational management; the realisation by hospital management and staff 
that care costs could increase substantially when control of HCAIs failed. Such emerging 
rationalisations were further supported by features of the environment that participants could 
refer to as shown in the quote by a medical manager: 
I think that there are obviously financial imperatives, both in terms of genuine 
penalties or incentives in contracts with commissioners, but also just things like the 
more HCAIs we have the longer the stay is, so the less patients we can get through 
the door. There is a massive financial imperative to get control of HCAIs. [T5M9 – 
Medical Manager] 
 
On other occasions they rejected as inappropriate and illegitimate those prescriptions 
that were perceived as having a negative impact on safety (e.g. leadership pushing forward a 
business agenda was seen as posing a risk to patient safety). In the latter case, the negative 
assessment was the result of staff having experienced a perceived tension or conflict with 
deeply held and internalised elements of shared beliefs and professional values (e.g. the 
tensions outlined above), which was not resolved by their experiences and interactions in 
their immediate context. From our observations, managers with a clinical background in our 
sample expressed such tensions or conflicts more often, which can be explained due to a 
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common value system and code of practice internalised by clinicians through their 
socialisation in the profession. 
  In sum, the collective sensemaking occurred in a social context in which 
professional norms, policy rules and organisational expectations affected rationalisation, 
which justified and legitimised specific conceptualisations of safety and associated patterns 
of behaviour. When interventions were perceived as justified (practical, sensible) and 
legitimised (appropriate) within the professional, policy and public discourses, and these 
articulations were further reinforced by first-hand experience of enacting safety practices in 
the workplace, safety priorities were reappraised. Without such alignment, changes in cultural 
dynamics would be less likely.   
 
Discussion 
In our empirical examples all actors agreed on the overarching goal of establishing a 
culture of safety observing the moral principle that “no health professional intends to harm 
patients”. But how can safety be accomplished in IPC by organisational members in their 
daily work in the light of forced change? Our analysis identified a repertoire of cognitive, 
material and symbolic resources available to hospital staff to action and interpret safety tasks 
in IPC. Staff flexibly drew upon the available resources from both the institutional and 
organisational environments to support different ‘strategies of action’ (i.e. Howard-Grenville 
et al 2011), which were informed by respondents’ localised assessments about the appropriate 
way of accomplishing safety in their specific situational contexts. 
The article advances knowledge by offering a nuanced understanding of how the 
organisational cultural repertoire can be enriched by the wider institutional environment. Our 
grounded study contributes to unpacking elements of the externalisation process of safety 
culture change (Antonsen 2009).  Specifically, it extends our understanding of the process of 
‘culture infusion’ (Harrison and Corley 2011) by elaborating an emergent model of situated 
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sensemaking following prolonged coerced pressures for culture change (Figure 1). In doing 
so, it offers conceptual clarity on how extra-organisational cognitive, symbolic and material 
resources are imported into the organisational culture, enabling and legitimising sustained 
collective action. The identified ‘tensions’ stemming from conflicting aspects of co-existing 
institutional logics in the NHS and ‘strategies of action’ crafted by staff across the hospitals 
in our study provided organisational members with discursive, legitimating and symbolic 
material to elaborate on the effectiveness, appropriateness and collective meaning of imposed 
changes. 
Our study makes a further contribution as it sought to address the missing level of 
extra-organisational institutional influences on safety culture in organisations. We offer an 
empirically grounded account on the microdynamics of logics, explaining how logics are 
negotiated collectively by actors on the ground and how they influence the crafting of 
organisational culture. Further, our analysis suggests that the institutional environment can 
shape organisational culture by conveying influence along a dual trajectory: a) via a direct 
macro-micro path, as organisational members reflect upon and negotiate cognitive, material 
and symbolic resources (e.g. changes in the professional associations or the code of practice 
impacting clinical managers), and b) an indirect macro-meso-micro path, whereby 
institutional dynamics shaped organisation-level arrangements that further influenced 
individuals’ interpretations, actions and interactions (e.g. legislation creating the DIPC role 
impacting reporting lines in hospitals and symbolising importance of IPC). Changes in 
organisational processes, structures and roles also constituted the indirect influence path by 
helping or restraining organisational actors to openly challenge some existing beliefs, and 
draw attention to new ones (Schein 2010). Macro-level institutional influences were drawn 
upon by hospital staff in tandem with own first-hand work experiences. Such reflections led 
to the development of new accepted justifications, making policies and behaviours 
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meaningful and explainable. The lack of justification following such situated collective 
sensemaking might help partially explain the findings in Public Inquiries which report 
fundamental deficits in safety culture despite proliferation of safety regulatory bodies 
(Francis  2013). As reported in reflections and re-analyses of high profile Public Inquiries 
(e.g. Francis 2015 ; Weick and Sutcliffe 2003), the mindset that something was sufficiently 
practical and reasonable could explain away both poor performance and the need to learn. 
The additional situated assessment of new policies or practices being also seen as legitimate 
and appropriate and thus justified adds an extra layer of re-assurance. As our empirical 
observations suggested, different interpretations and tensions will continue to exist among 
members of organisations. Thus, the focus of safety culture promotion should not be on 
achieving a conflict-free organisation, but on facilitating staff to rationalise new behaviours 
and translate fragmented experiences into a coherent new worldview (Antonsen 2009).  
While our research approach has advantages, notably rich, first-hand accounts in which 
abstract interventions and changes were rendered personally meaningful to our respondents, 
our work is not without limitations. Our empirical study focuses on IPC in the context of 
patient safety in English hospitals; in contrast to the central role of governmental bodies in 
funding health services within the NHS, such governmental organisations might be less able 
to intervene in health systems which are funded through more diverse sources, or governed 
less centrally as elsewhere in Europe (Birgand et al. 2018), or in the USA. Our primary data 
derive from interviews which explored views, perceptions, and experiences of respondents, 
self-reports on activities and practices. We were not able to observe first-hand differences in 
behavioural patterns; depth ethnographic studies have the power to reveal individual and 
group behaviours (e.g. Dixon-Woods et al. 2012; Charani et al. 2018).  
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Conclusions  
Organisational safety culture in IPC involves multilevel phenomena and by considering 
how institutional forces enrich the organisational cultural repertoire, this study advances 
knowledge on coerced culture change. The study elaborates a dual trajectory of macro-
institutional influences via the organisation and direct to individuals. Sustainable cultural 
change, especially in professionalised settings such as healthcare, we argue, happens when 
institutions also change but this is a slow process requiring sustained efforts in clinical 
practice, policy, regulation, media, patient forums and professional arenas.  
Cultivating a safety culture in healthcare organisations requires the wider institutional 
environment to support and justify revised professional roles, organisational strategies, 
governance structures, and a new collective cognitive frame that makes such changes appear 
meaningful, sensible, workable, and appropriate also to the local context. It follows that such 
changes will then be seen as legitimate and worthwhile. Whether changes in cultural 
expectations and the mindset actually happen depend both on NHS professional norms, 
policy rules, discourses and organisational expectations, but also on what people experience 
in their local and immediate surroundings. In addition, this is a dynamic  process which needs 
to be constantly reinforced and maintained over time to lead to sustainable outcomes.  If for 
example the NHS stops investing in this area cultural changes achieved can be undermined. 
The opportunities and constraints arising from the institutional context can assist policy 
makers, managers and clinicians to recognise the boundaries of their action. They can also 
utilise this layer of influence as part of their ‘toolkit’ for safety improvements.    
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Figure 1 Coding Structure 
First order themes  Cluster themes Overarching Themes 
  Tensions stemming from conflict of institutional 
logics 
Professional - Market/corporate - State 
How did organisational members make 
sense of forceful changes on safety 
collectively? 
    
Strategies of action 
      
 
        
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Safety scope: universal 
vs restricted 
 
1a. IPC widely talked about  
1b. Shared commitment on IPC 
1c. IPC being everybody’s business 
 
2a. Challenging the norm 
2b. Challenging behaviour 
2c. Challenging the evidence  
 
 
2. Being open: encouraged 
vs feared 
3a. Balancing productivity with safety 
3b. Safety is not negotiable  
3c. Targets perceived as realistic - 
appropriate 
 
 
Situated assessment: 
 
Safety sensibility   
“is it sensible?” 
 
Safety legitimacy  
“is it appropriate?”   
 
Safety pragmatism  
“does it work?” 
 
 
3. Prioritising external 
mandates vs local 
relevance 
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Figure 2 Classification of Institutional Influences 2000-2015 in IPC in the English NHS 
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Table 1 Informants break down by trust and professional background  
 
Professional background 
of manager informants 
(NHS Trust Code) 
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 Total 
Medical  5 2 5 2 3 2 6 1 2 28 
Nurse  10 9 8 5 5 8 6 1 9 61 
Non-clinical  3 4 4 3 4 3 3 0 1 25 
Allied health professional 1 0 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 6 
Pharmacist 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 10 
Total 20 16 19 13 15 14 17 3 13 130 
T8 – access issues  due to an infection outbreak during the study periodSenior and middle-level managers  
DIPC, Medical Director and senior estates/operation are the ‘senior’ respondents  
Split overall: 23% senior and 77% middle 
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Supplementary Table. Extensive summary of quote examples of first order themes 
First order theme Exemplar quotes 
1a. IPC widely talked 
about 
I think infection prevention has become more known about really.  It’s more prominent now [in the NHS] than it 
ever was before.  [T9M13 – Nurse Manager] 
The nurses were very quick to adopt things that other places were doing. [...] there is a lot of scepticism from 
consultants that the various things they were asked to do were irrelevant, why do I need to do it?  These infections 
are nothing to do with me? [T5M5 – Medical Manager] 
1b. Shared commitment 
on IPC 
 
To my mind it was about a very committed team behind it and a lot of engagement with the area in which it was 
being introduced. [T1M8 – Medical Manager] 
We have a weekly infection control meeting which is actually chaired by the chief executive – it is the only meeting 
he does chair, as far as I’m aware. So, it’s a very, very high priority in the trust. [T3M12- Nurse Manager] 
If we had then got a trust-wide issue then you might call, what they tend to call a mere Summit where they are 
developing trust-wide issue we now want all of the matrons in the room at the same time discussing what they are 
going to do.  And there are some summits going on at the minute in respect of management of C. diff. [T7M1- 
Nurse Manager] 
1c. IPC being 
everybody’s business 
 
IPC is on everybody’s mind all the time…everybody knows this is the priority that is embedded into people’s 
thinking. [T3M11 – Nurse Manager] 
I think it has changed greatly over the last few years, I think [IPC] has become a much more widely talked about 
topic at all levels of the trust. Whereas before it was quite a nurse centric kind of area to look at, it was mainly 
nurses that were on the team and involved in it.  But I think over the last few years things have changed 
dramatically, and I think most of the groups that I go to in the trust will be aware of the importance of infection 
control and will take that into consideration when they talk about things. [T4M11 – Nurse Manager] 
Everybody has infection prevention in their job description they have to have it reviewed annually and do a job 
performance review and I think everyone is aware of the goals of the infection prevention team. [T9M13- Nurse 
Manager] 
2a. Challenging the 
norm 
 
Competition is quite a strong motivating force for most doctors, because ironically, we still select our medical 
students on the basis of competition.  We take the people who have performed best in their ‘A’ levels and GCSE’s. 
Throughout medical school, not intentionally, but they compete with each other.  Then they leave medical school 
and they compete for the best jobs.  And when they finally get to the point of being a GP or a consultant then what 
we value most is team work, and they have all been trained not to work in teams for the whole of their career they 
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First order theme Exemplar quotes 
have been trained not to work in teams, and then suddenly you want them to work in teams. And of course, it just 
doesn’t happen because we have trained a group of individuals. And I think things are changing in that respect... 
So, competition is a real driver and that actually was what I utilised, apart from personal relationships, the way in 
which we pushed the infection control agenda forward by me presenting people with data saying, look this hospital 
has managed to do this over the last 12 months and here are our infection rates they are still here.  And to take it 
down even to wards, and say, look your ward is really good, or your ward is really bad, I never have to say that, I 
just show the data.  Here is the data – this is where you are, do you think you can do anything about? Everybody 
usually says, of course we can, [...] that really brings about engagement from consultants, which otherwise 
extraordinary to get. [T5M5 – Medical Manager] 
Yes, the thing is we’re all responsible for it. So, what these infection control meetings that we have, you know 
they’re quite intense meetings and no prisoners taken really so you’re made to account for your actions and the 
actions of your department. So, I think that helps from a top down approach a bit more sort of a zero-tolerance 
policy to it because it’s a serious business really. [T5M14 – Senior Pharmacist Manager] 
2b. Challenging 
behaviour 
 
I’d spoke to XXX before, our Medical Director, and said, look XXX, this is my approach now, I just want to make 
sure you’re OK with this, but my view is that this is a clear evidence base that this works, we’ve got adoption now 
across 80% of the group, my view now is that to not apply this 100% in terms of our practice is actually negligent 
and that to not have 20% of our patient cohort not having access to what we know is best practice and will improve 
their outcomes and reduce their lengths of stay and get them out of hospital so much quicker and enhance their 
experience and manage their pain and all those things, to not do that is to be deliberately disadvantaging that 
group of patients.  And if those surgeons who are responsible for that group of patients can’t comply with the 
programme then we stop them doing those procedures, because it’s not acceptable for them to practice in a way 
that we know is less than optimal …And that’s where it gets to in terms of translating the evidence base, through 
implementation, through adoption, into performance management, into delivery on the ground.  And with that 
there are improvements, praise, and all of that but there’s also sanctions, and if people won’t adopt the evidence 
then we will take them, we will take whatever action is necessary.  And certainly, around infection control we 
said years ago, we would never ever sanction somebody who let someone go to theatre without taking consent, 
and said oh well, OK, it was all right, it was lucky we did the right operation today. [T5M8 – Senior Nurse 
Manager] 
… the main problem is the clinicians and the main problem with them I think is simply their working patterns 
and their priorities. it worked well when you can engage one influential clinician informally and sell the concept 
and they can act as the champion within their own peer group. But if you can’t do that then and you are taking the 
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First order theme Exemplar quotes 
concept instead to a regular meeting or forum then you’ve got a number of them around the table and if 2 or 3 
decide to react negatively that can quite often be enough to destroy. [T7M14 – Non-Clinical Manager] 
Well the formal markers published infectious rates, we don’t actually compare well to some other trusts…so if you 
judge it on that level we’re not good.  I think in ways, and there are loads of reasons for that, tutorial political 
reasons.  In terms of how our team is beginning to function and that judgement is just based upon talking to 
colleagues in other trusts and sharing experiences.  So, the hard published data is one method, simplistic but I 
don’t think it gives the picture of everything.  So that other evidence is based more on the experiences of talking 
with others’ judgements and rather than hard published data.  And also because of the relationships, personally I 
think, that having system on site does begin to simulate thoughts around others and gives a more questioning 
attitude to some things we do. Better education, I think in that having an environment and culture, where people 
can discuss different types of evidence.  And there is no pressure to dismiss, I think in that in a way, that is why we 
are beginning to become good here.  [T1M5 – Nurse Manager] 
2c. Challenging the 
evidence  
 
I think one of the other challenges we get frequently and the best example I can give you is bare below the elbow. 
What we would say this is a good thing to do it because it inspires patient confidence.  Patients like to see health 
care workers washing their hands but the challenge back to us particularly from medical staff there is no evidence 
base. And then it’s how you, if one person in a directorate starts saying there is poor evidence base that grows 
like toxic in that directorate. And it’s about how do you get to that to say it’s not just evidence it’s about 
confidence, so there is a communication challenge there. By the time you hear about that challenge there’s no 
evidence base it spreads throughout a group of who say we don’t agree with this. There is no evidence base, so 
we’re not doing it. [T7M5 - Senior Nurse Manager] 
Infection control is very anecdotal and there is not that much solid evidence, it is just best practice.  And a lot of 
the research that is out there is generally quite old.  You could say ‘yes we do that’ you know anecdotally that it 
works but there is no research around that subject.  And we’re constantly getting asked by the medical teams you 
know you’re telling me to do that, take my tie off, you’re telling me I’ve got to roll my sleeves up and be bare 
below the elbows give me the evidence it works.  And that is the problem in infection control there is not the 
evidence out there that is statistically significant that will give the medical teams the evidence that they need. [T6 
M5 – Nurse Manager] 
3a. Balancing 
productivity with safety 
It is a really complicated mixture of political imperative feeling that we were getting a bad name and so that is 
where you get the support of management saying, “You have got to implement this regardless. [T3M3 – Medical 
Manager] 
3b. Safety is not You’ve had a needle stick injury, or you’ve left something lying and you owned up to it, but you haven’t been 
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First order theme Exemplar quotes 
negotiable disciplined or anything like that, it’s a lesson learning culture rather than trying to penalise people.  People do 
make mistakes and people need to learn from mistakes and I think if it’s too much a stick culture people will, 
human beings will, human nature and they’ll try and hide and therefore you don’t get the evidence.  Because you 
could be doing something that you’ve done for years and suddenly someone inherently sees there’s a problem with 
it, in actually someone, by a different pair of eyes looking at it.  Well we’ve always done it the same, well it’s not 
the right way. [T4M6- Senior Non-Clinical Manager] 
3c. Targets perceived as 
realistic - appropriate 
Absolutely.  It is, it is, for me, about ensuring that you pitch the information at, at the right level.  So, if you say to 
a physician, you need to wash your hands and your patients will have far less infections, and they say, my 
infection rate is zero, what, where do you go from there?  How do you, how do you do that?  [T9M4 – Nurse 
Manager] 
It’s all down to targets…… [T4M1 – Medical Manager] 
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Supplementary Table. Collective sensemaking  - Additional quotes  
You’ve got a good reputation in your area, I know that, I come in and you’ve had a patient that’s fallen, and I think at that point you’re quite 
susceptible because there’s kind of all the guilt and the emotional side of you’ve had a patient that’s been harmed, I come in, I kept you at a 
vulnerable moment to talk about your practice, I hopefully start to show you what is good practice, and that then influences you to start to 
change your behaviour, which then spreads to the next people working around you. [T3M16 – Non Clinical Manager] 
 
I think, in terms of moving that forward, there was a high profile focus from the infection prevention team, almost to the point of aggressive at 
times, and in terms of […] Aggressive championship that sometimes could be perceived as being over challenging from some of the ward 
areas of, and I think for a period of time we almost developed a blame culture around why patients weren’t isolated quickly enough, which 
left it wobbly for a short while.  But a raised profile, I think as people then started to get the education from the infection team that went 
along with that high profile drive, and I think a lot of this was down to the fact a number of other trusts had been hit quite hard nationally 
and were being very publicly berated for their poor infection performance.  So I think the very dynamic, very enthusiastic, high powered 
approach was probably a result of high stress coming in at an executive level in the beginning, but as that got rolled out and communication 
improved and people started to understand. [T9M3 - Nurse] 
 
No, infection control is not lucky. We shouldn’t be touching wood when we don’t have a bacteremia, that’s clearly unacceptable. We don’t 
touch wood that we did the operation all right did we? That’s just, it’s a bizarre frame of mind that people treat infection control in a way 
that somehow is negotiable, you might do it, you might not, you might practice safe, it might be consistent, it might not. Get that sorted. So 
that’s the way we run it here. [T5M8 - Senior Nurse] 
 
